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ABSTRACT 
In many countries, cash is fast disappearing. Credit cards, online banking apps, or 
digital services such as ApplePay, Paypal, or Venmo are now used by a large part of 
the population as their main means of payment. The common narrative of digital 
payments presents them as the solution to a number of problems, from tax evasion to 
financial exclusion. Yet, this paper will show that the disappearance of cash is giving 
rise to a situation of forced economic exclusion to a portion of society which uses cash 
as its only means of payment. The groups include, unbanked individuals, persons with 
mental health and physical disabilities, or poor digital literacy. Most ofthe population 
at risk of exclusion live in conditions of poverty and social marginalization. For them, 
not being able to pay with banknotes means total social and economic exclusion. I 
define this phenomenon as ‘monetary exclusion’. 
The goal of this essay is to analyse what monetary exclusion means from a regulatory 
perspective, what its origins are, and how to overcome it. In doing so, I discuss the 
evolution of retail payments design in the US and UK, from the ‘old’ banknote system 
to the new cashless payments, and the role played by Central Banks, banks, and 
payment service providers. This article argues that monetary exclusion in a cashless 
economy is due to a flawed regulatory design in which private operators are de-facto 
put in control of a fundamental social good. In the past, the State, through the issuance 
of banknotes, played a fundamental role in safeguarding monetary inclusion for its 
citizens. The nature of cash indeed guarantees universal access to a basic means of 
payment for everyone.  
However, the disappearance of cash and the rising importance of bank deposits as the 
main source of money has progressively transferred control over the access to the 
payment system to private banks. The rise of digital payment start-ups over the last 
decade is dangerously shifting the control of monetary access even further away from 
the public sphere. This essay will demonstrate that digital payments present 
fundamental accessibility problems, which inevitably lead to the marginalization of the 
poor and minority groups. To overcome the limits of cashless payments, it is necessary 
to redesign a cashless payment system in which universality of access is mandatory.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the launch of the debit and credit card in the 1960s, innovations in payment 
technology have progressively reduced our dependence on cash for retail transactions.1 
Undoubtedly, the shift has increased further with the rise of smartphones, which now offer 
a variety of mobile-based payment solutions, from digital wallets to web-based bank apps.2 
GooglePay, ApplePay, Venmo, Paypal, or Wechat in China, are just some of the new players 
disrupting the traditional payments channels. In a few countries, like Sweden, Singapore, 
China, and the United Kingdom, the share of electronic transactions has already largely 
surpassed cash. For them, a full cashless economy is no longer a dream.3 The speed of 
change over the last decade has led some commentators to predict a very quick transition 
from a cash-based to a cash-less society.4  
Given their transparency and operability through mobile devices, electronic payments are 
believed to offer a solution to a range of diverse problems, from money laundering to tax 
evasion, or even tackling low inflation.5 International donors6 and the payment industry7 see 
digital payments as the next tool to combat poverty. For this reason, a few governments 
around the world are actively trying to reduce reliance on cash and are moving progressively 
towards a full electronic payment system.8 In many European countries, for instance, 
governments have introduced ceilings on cash transactions and eliminated high-
denomination notes.9 In the United States, under the Bank Secrecy Act, banks are required 
to file a ‘Suspicious Activity Report”, for any suspicious activity involving more than 
$3,000.10 Laws mandating banks’ disclosure of large cash deposits and withdrawals are 
adopted also in most Western and Asian countries. In a few cities, buses and metro rides 
can be paid only with a digital card. More importantly, even without direct government 
intervention, it is the new financial and retail ecosystem that seems to be naturally favouring 
 
1 Tom Fish & Roy Whymark, How Has Cash Usage Evolved in Recent Decades? What Might Drive Demand 
in The Future? (Q3 Bank of Engl. Quarterly Bulletin) September 2015. 
2 See Capgemini and BNP Paribas, World Payments Report 2018’. 
3 See Morten Bach et al., Payments Are A-Changing’ but Cash Still Rules, (BIS Quarterly Review) 2018, at 
67, 67-73; Walter Engert et al, Is a Cashless Society Problematic? 9 (Bank of Canada Staff Discussion 
Paper No. 12, 2018); UK Markets, UK Payment Markets Summary, June 2019. 
4 KENNETH ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH (2016). 
5 Ambreena Manji, Eliminating Poverty? ‘Financial Inclusion’, Access to Land, and Gender Equality in 
International Development, Mod. L. Rev., Oct. 22, 2010, at 985, 985. 
6 See WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL? PROBLEMS AND PITFALL IN EXPANDING 
ACCESS (2012)’ WORLD BANK, DIGITAL DIVIDENDS: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
(2016).  
7 The mobile payment and telecom industry have established and financed an association – GSMA – 
that conducts research and organizes events around the world to promote industry standards on 
mobile banking. See The Enablement Effect, https://www.gsma.com/  
8 Among them, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the European Central bank, the Swedish 
Central bank.  
9 Deutsche Bundesbank, Cash Discussed at Symposium (Jun. 15, 2016), 
https://www.bundesbank.de/en/tasks/topics/cash-discussed-at-symposium-635170. 
10 12 U.S.C. § 1813 and 1818 (Year); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (Year). 
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non-cash payments. Indeed, in many countries, mainstream platform-based services such 
as UBER, can now only be purchased by credit card.11  
While the decline of cash is not uniform around the world - with some countries, like the 
United States still clinging onto banknotes - the reduction in the usage of physical notes 
and coins seems to be an inevitable and long-term trend.12 Yet, the transition from a cash-
based to a cash-less society is not without costs. The progressive disappearance of cash has 
made access to payments very difficult for vulnerable groups which, for different reasons, 
find themselves unable to operate cashless payments.13 These groups include the elderly, 
people living with disabilities or suffering from health issues, homeless persons, immigrants, 
and individuals living in a condition of poverty. For them, cash is a necessity more than a 
choice. The problem is even worse for those individuals without a bank account. Indeed, 
the bank-dependent nature of cashless payments creates a double whammy that locks 
unbanked individuals out of both the credit system and the cashless payment system. Thus, 
the inability to pay with cash for food or clothes not only excludes a sizeable minority of 
individuals from any official credit opportunities, but it also puts them in the a dire 
condition of poverty and forced social exclusion. I define this phenomenon as ‘monetary 
exclusion’.  
Awareness of this problem is just only emerging. In the United Kingdom, the Parliament 
has recently published a report – the Access to Cash Review Report - to examine the social 
implications of the cashless society. The report warns that the quick demise of cash could 
soon leave 17% of the UK population struggling to make even the most basic payments.14 In 
the United States, a 2019 US Congress report – Long Live Cash - similarly warned that the 
steady decline of banknotes and the inevitable rise of cashless payments will soon leave the 
9 million unbanked households in the same situation of monetary exclusion that we now 
see in the UK.15 In Sweden, arguably the country with the lowest share of cash transactions 
and with the most pro-cashless environment, the mounting opposition of elderly people to 
 
11 A GUIDE TO UBER PAYMENTS, https://www.uber.com/en-GB/blog/uber-payment-options/; 
Amazon Go changed its policy to enable cash payments only in late 2019. See Katie Kanales, We tried 
to pay $1 in cash for a soda at Amazon’s cashier-less convenience store of the future, and it took way longer 
than expected, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2019, 5:19 PM),  https://www.businessinsider.com/how-
to-pay-cash-amazon-go-san-francisco-2019-9?r=US&IR=T  
12 Raynil Kumar et al., 2018 Findings from the Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, FED. RES. BANK OF 
SAN FRANCISCO (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.frbsf.org/cash/publications/fed-
notes/2018/november/2018-findings-from-the-diary-of-consumer-payment-choice/.  
13 See Charles Randell, Chairman, Fin. Con. Authority, Speech delivered at the Retail Banking 
Conference: Is it a Wonderful Life? (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/is-it-a-
wonderful-life. 
14 Access to Cash, Access to Cash Review: Final Report, March 2019, https://www.accesstocash.org.uk/. 
15 David Perkins, Long Live Cash: The Potential Decline of Cash Usage and Related Implications, CONG. 
RES. SERV 1, 23 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45716; On the fact that 
cashless payments have not yet taken off in the US, see Kate Rooney, Mobile payments have barely 
caught on in the US, despite the rise of smartphones, CNBC (Aug. 29, 2019, 12:51 PM, updated 6:32 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/29/why-mobile-payments-have-barely-caught-on-in-the-us.html. 
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the disappearance of cash has led the central bank Governor to publicly voice his scepticism 
as to whether a cashless future would be feasible.16  
A need therefore arises to guarantee that the benefits of economic innovations in payments 
will not be achieved at the expense of those who need them the most.17 The movement 
against the war on cash is in its infancy, but it is already gaining traction. In many countries, 
civil society groups and journalists are actively challenging the dominant positive narrative 
surrounding cashless payments, instead showing the detrimental effects of a cashless society 
on minority groups and the poor.18 In the United States, two bills that address the 
discriminatory effect of the war on cash are under discussion in Congress. The Payment 
Choice Act 201919 and the Cash Always Should Be Honored Act 201920 aim to make it unlawful 
for a retail establishment to refuse payment in legal tender for goods sold in such an 
establishment. Under the Payment Choice Act, individuals should also have a private right 
to action to challenge the discriminatory effect of digital sales.21 Finally, in a 2019 speech, 
Charles Randell, the Chair of the Financial Conduct Authority – the UK biggest financial 
regulator – acknowledged for the first time that cashless payments indeed disproportionately 
affect those who are less able to afford them.22 Something must be done. 
The goal of this article is to examine the rising phenomenon of monetary exclusion and the 
reasons behind it. While the problem has many legal dimensions, from the constitutional 
requirement of non-discrimination23 to the more commercial law aspects of retail 
payments,24 this article instead focuses on the regulatory aspects of monetary exclusion. 
More specifically, I examine how regulatory design influences access to payment. In doing 
so, I discuss the evolution of retail payments design from the ‘old’ banknote system to the 
new cashless payments. The main argument advanced in this essay is that the move towards 
 
16 See Stefan Ingves, Going Cashless, IMF FIN. DEV (Jun. 2018), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/central-banks-and-digital-currencies/point.htm; 
Maddy Savage, The Swedes Rebelling Against a Cashless Society, BBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43645676. 
17 See Nicolas Cachanosky, Is Money a Public Good? AIER (Feb. 17, 2011), https://www.aier.org/article/is-
money-a-public-good/.   
18 Katie Evans, Ending Financial Exclusion MONEY AND MENTAL HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE, 
https://www.moneyandmentalhealth.org/ending-financial-exclusion/ (last visited…); Joe Lepper, 
Cashless society ‘putting vulnerable people at risk of digital exclusion’, CHARITY DIGITAL NEWS (Nov. 
19, 2019), https://www.charitydigitalnews.co.uk/2019/11/14/cashless-society-putting-vulnerable-people-
at-risk-of-digital-exclusion/; Amy Westerwelt, In The Rush Toward A Cashless Society, The Poorest Are 
At Risk Of Further Exclusion, HUFF. POST, February 16, 2018.  
19 Payment Choice Act of 2019, H.R. 2650, 116th Cong. 
20 Cash Should Always be Honored (CASH) Act, H.R. 2630, 116th Cong. (2019). 
21 Payment Choice Act of 2019, H.R. 2650, 116th Cong § 5104 
22 Randell, supra note 13. 
23 In the United States, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit State and Federal 
governments to deny a fundamental right to individuals of a suspected classification. On this, see 
Samuel Erlanger, A Cashless Economy: How to Protect the Low-Income, CARDOZO. L. REV. 166, 186-
192 (de-novo 2019). 
24 See Adam J. Levitin, Pandora's Digital Box: The Promise and Perils of Digital Wallets, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 305 (2018); Adam J. Levitin, Priceless: The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1321 (2007). 
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cashless payments is the result of a progressive regulatory shift away from the state-based 
payment system dominated by cash in which access to a means of payment is universal, 
towards a private monetary regime. A private regime in which banks, payment firms, and 
commerce platforms are controlling who is able to access their services. While the essay 
relies mostly on the experience of the United States and the United Kingdom, the study 
nonetheless aims to make a general theoretical contribution to the understanding of the 
cashless economy.25 A contribution that, in the author’s view, shall also trigger the debate 
in other countries.  
First, this essay will contribute to the emerging legal scholarship on economic inequality 
and access to finance, and, more generally, on the burgeoning debate of the social value of 
financial services.26  Because of the hybrid nature of cashless payments as both digital 
devices and financial services, the debate on monetary exclusion is inextricably linked to 
that on digital exclusion and financial exclusion. As digital devices, cashless payments 
services can become impossible to access for individuals that have no access to a broadband 
network, or that are unable to use internet or smartphones. Despite the widespread 
availability of internet and the relatively cheap price of smartphones and computers, the 
digital divide is still affecting part of the population. The World Economic Forum has 
recently released a study showing that in the United States 29% of adults in households with 
an income below $30,000 a year don’t own a smartphone, while 44% of adults don’t have 
access to a broadband service or own a traditional computer.27 The digital divide is 
particularly evident in rural areas, where more than 30% of Americans don’t have access to 
broadband.28 A very similar situation occurs in the United Kingdom and in other countries 
in Europe and Asia.29  
As financial services, digital payments, are also linked to the debate on financial exclusion. 
Despite cashless payment solutions now being offered by tech-firms alongside banks, the 
 
25 The United Kingdom is a very good case study for monetary exclusion. Since the late 2000s, the 
UK government has promoted various regulatory initiatives to enhance the use of cashless payments 
and has actively encouraged FinTech start-ups to establish in London. As of 2020, cashless 
transactions have largely surpassed cash as the main retail payment method. At the same time, the 
U.K. press and consumer associations were among the first to highlight the social risks of the cashless 
economy. 
26 Abbey Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (2019); Michael S. Barr, 
Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 605-06 
(2005); Greta R. Krippner, Democracy of Credit: Ownership and the Politics of Credit Access in Late 
Twentieth-Century America, 123 AM. J. SOC. 1, 2 (2017); Gunnar Trumbull, Credit Access and Social 
Welfare: The Rise of Consumer Lending in the United States and France, 40 POL. & SOC’Y 9, 10 (2012); 
MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, 
AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 210-25 (2015); LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF 
AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 81 (2017). 
27 Monica Anderson & Madhumitha Kumar, The Digital Divide Continues In The US As Lower-Income 
Americans Fall Behind, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/digital-divide-persists-even-as-lower-income-americans-
make-gains-in-tech-adoption/. 
28 John Hendel & Tucker Doherty, GRAPHIC: America's digital divide in 2 maps, POLITICO (Jul. 2, 
2018), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/digital-divide-in-america-graphic-000639 
29 Access to Cash, Supra note 14, at 37-39. 
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large majority of cashless payments still require users to have a bank account from which 
money is transferred to an e-wallet. Hence, despite the pledge of payments start-ups to raise 
people up out of poverty, cashless payments are unfortunately only reinforcing a doom loop 
of financial exclusion. In addition, the sophisticated design of digital payment instruments, 
whilst attracting a large cohort of users, nonetheless tends to exclude a minority of 
customers who are unable to understand or operate the payments’ digital interface.  
Second, this article contributes to the literature on payments law and regulation. It will do 
so by analysing how regulation and monetary design can restrict or open both individuals’ 
and firms’ abilities to use money and to access the payment system, and thus exert their 
socio-economic role as consumers and traders. I will look at the evolution of money and 
retail payments through history.30 For centuries, individuals overwhelmingly relied on 
banknotes and coins to exert their socio-ec0nomic role of consumers and traders. 
Individuals’ access to retail payments was guaranteed by direct government intervention in 
the form of State-backed banknotes. In a fiat monetary system, the central bank’s monopoly 
in the printing of banknotes and in the control of the money supply offers a basic and yet 
extremely efficient payment instrument for everyone. A payment method that ignores the 
socio-economic characteristics of its users and instead relies on the credibility of the entity 
issuing money – the Government, through the central bank. With the increasing central role 
of bank deposits as the main form of money since the early 20th century, private banks took 
a central role in the money creation and distribution system. Individuals and firms could 
rely on both bank deposits and state-backed banknotes as the main form of money. Yet, 
unlike banknotes, bank deposits have much higher barriers to access as banks offer them 
on market conditions and subject to regulations, thus excluding some individuals and firms. 
Moreover, even though mobile app digital payments are typically zero or low cost, they entail 
a fundamental bargain with the users that is not present with cash.31 This includes the lack 
of anonymity of transactions, the appropriation of users’ data, and the lack of 
interoperability with other providers in a shared network.32 Moreover, unlike cash, digital 
payments are dependent on wireless technology networks for their very functioning, which 
are not fault-proof. In a cashless society there is a strict correlation between the protection 
of property rights of money guaranteed by law and the availability of payment technology, 
which on the contrary, is left to market forces. The asynchrony between these two elements 
is the main regulatory challenge for the future of payments.   
This essay will analyse the problem of monetary exclusion, and it will show the role of 
regulation in addressing it. In order to demonstrate my argument, in Section 2 I will set out 
 
30 For the sake of simplicity, I will consider only the modern banknotes as it emerged in the last two 
centuries. For a discussion on earlier monetary history, see CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: 
COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE MAKING OF CAPITALISM (2014). See also BENJAMIN GEVA, THE 
PAYMENT ORDER OF ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE-AGES: A LEGAL HISTORY (2011).   
31 On the contrary to credit and debit cards, which are arguably the most expensive payment system. 
See Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America's Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the 
Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 272-73 (2005); David Humphrey et al., What Does 
it Cost to Make a Payment? 2 REV. OF NET. ECON. 159, 162-63 (2003). 
32 Levitin, Supra note 24.  
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the theoretical framework to understand monetary inclusion. In Section 3, I will analyse the 
evolution of the central bank banknote and its role in monetary inclusion. Section 4 will 
discuss the rise of bank deposits as the main form of money and how this influences 
monetary exclusion. Section 5 will analyse the emergence of the cashless economy and its 
impact on monetary exclusion. Section 6 will propose some regulatory strategies for 
monetary inclusion in a cashless world. 
 
II. FRAMING THE REGULATORY DEBATE ON MONETARY EXCLUSION 
In Western economies, the debate on financial exclusion has mostly focused on the 
unaffordability or lack of access to credit, and on the reduced access to savings and 
pensions.33 Within this debate, the analysis of the relationship between access to credit, 
economic inequality, and discriminations has emerged as one of the hottest topic in the 
policy narrative.34 The works of scholars like Jacob Haker, Mehrsa Baradan, or Jonathan 
Mordock and Rachel Schneider, to mention just a few, demonstrate how a mix of poor 
regulatory interventions, racial biases, and extreme free market economy has forced an 
increasingly high proportion of individuals to a vicious cycle of increasing indebtedness.35   
Within the broader discussion on financial exclusion, the problem of access to the payment 
system has barely emerged.36 On the contrary, the large majority of the specialized literature 
and the entire popular narrative on digital payments purports them as one of the key tools 
to lift people out of poverty.37 For instance, one of Facebook’s core claims on the Libra 
project was that the new currency and payment method will help the 1,7 Billion unbanked 
 
33 Financial inclusion has emerged since the early 2000s as one of the fundamental objectives of 
development economics. International Organizations like the World Bank or the United Nations, and 
large private donors like the Gates Foundations have invested hundreds of millions of dollars to 
investigate the causes of financial exclusion in developing countries, and to set up projects around 
the world to expand access to financial services. In western economies, the debate was much less 
focused on how to ‘develop’ the foundations of the financial system, and more focused on the impact 
of debt – including credit card, mortgage, payday loans, and university costs - on low income families.  
34 A. Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as A Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (2019); Creola Johnson, 
Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending? 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002); Angela Littwin, 
Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 451, 458 (2008); Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities 
to Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 187 (2010); LISA SERVON, 
THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 81 (2017); Mehrsa 
Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283 (2014). 
35 JACKOB HAKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT:  THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS, 
FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK (2006); 
BARADARAN, supra note 26; JONATHAN MURDOCH & RACHEL SCHNEIDER, THE 
FINANCIAL LIFE OF THE POOR: HOW AMERICAN FAMILIES COPE IN A WORLD OF 
UNCERTAINTY (2017). 
36 See Erlanger, Supra note 23; Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 
828-836 (2018). 
37 For a good overview on the literature on payments and financial inclusion, see WORLD BANK, 
DIGITAL DIVIDENDS: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2016); CPMI WORLD BANK 
GROUP, PAYMENT ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2016). 
 8 
individuals to access the financial system.38 The World Economic Forum claims that digital 
payments will “finally close the financial inclusion gap.”39 Even Visa, the credit card firm, 
boasts on its website that “Visa’s global network is a powerful platform to advance financial 
inclusion”.40 Yet, in countries where the shift towards cashless payments is more 
pronounced, emerging evidence suggests the very opposite.41  
The emerging phenomenon of monetary exclusion, and the asynchrony between the popular 
narrative and the reality on the ground, forces us to investigate the link between a specific 
payment method and inequality. In this section, I will provide the theoretical foundations 
of the analysis on payment methods.  
 
A. Defining Monetary Exclusion 
The first issue to define the precise meaning of monetary exclusion. In policy debate 
financial exclusion is usually defined as the situation in which an individual, because of their 
lack of access to the mainstream financial system, is unable to manage day-to-day financial 
transactions, meet expenses, manage a financial loss, and avoid or reduce a problem debt.42 
As such, financial exclusion can refer to the lack of access to various financial products, such 
as transactions, payments, savings, credit and insurance.43 More broadly, the term monetary 
exclusion can be used to define the inability of individuals or firms to transfer monetary 
value to other individuals and firms in exchange for goods or services. In this sense, an 
inclusive monetary system would be one where every individual has the ability to choose the 
payment method that is most convenient and efficient: to pay a meal with banknotes, or to 
pay university fees through an electronic bank transfer, or pay the metro fare with a 
smartphone e-wallet app.  
On a deeper level, however, equality in access to payments is the result of specific 
institutional and monetary design.44 From an economic perspective, the higher the 
regulatory, social, or economic barriers to the usage of money, the lower the network effects 
that money can rely on as less people will accept using them to discharge debts. Only by 
 
38 LIBRA, White Paper, https://libra.org/en-US/white-paper/ (last visited…). 
39 Mehul Desai, The Benefits of a Cashless Society, WORLD. ECONOMIC FORUM (7 January 2020) 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/benefits-cashless-society-mobile-payments/  
40 VISA, Financial Inclusion, https://www.visa.co.uk/about-visa/financial-inclusion.html (last visited…). 
41 BBC, Free cash machines vanishing at alarming rate, says Which? BBC NEWS (May 1, 2019) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48107372. 
42 See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL EXCLUSION, TACKLING 
FINANCIAL EXCLUSION: A COUNTRY THAT WORKS FOR EVERYONE? H.L. PAPER 132, 1, at 
10 (2016-17). 
43 The World Bank defines financial inclusion as the situation in which “individuals and businesses 
have access to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs – 
transactions, payments, savings, credit and insurance – delivered in a responsible and sustainable 
way.’ See THE WORLD BANK, Financial Inclusion: Overview, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview (last visited…). 
44 See Christine Desan, The Constitutional Approach of Money: Monetary Design and the Production of the 
Modern World, in MONEY TALKS: EXPLAINING HOW MONEY REALLY WORKS (Nina Bandelj 
et al., eds., 2017). 
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guaranteeing total equality among users, can money be used by everyone and, thus, exert its 
fundamental economic and social functions as a medium of exchange, store of value, and 
unit of account.45 Thus, from a regulatory perspective, one of the main objectives of payment 
and monetary policy is to reduce friction to the access and use of money. This is especially 
true with regard to retail payments, which enable individuals to intermediate money for 
their everyday life expenses.  
The ability to transfer monetary value is the result of a combination of two separate 
elements: access to payment methods in the narrow sense, and access to a source of money 
– either central bank notes, or bank deposits - that can be intermediated through the 
payment system. To make the distinction clear, I will now provide two examples. Barriers to 
access to payment methods would arise when an individual with access to bank deposit 
account is not able to transfer money because he/she cannot operate a digital bank app, or 
because he/she does not qualify for a credit card. Conversely, barriers to access to money 
would arise when an individual is unable to access a bank account through which he can 
then transfer money via the various payment methods. Thus, although he/she is in theory 
able to operate a smartphone or a computer, he/she is nevertheless unable to pay because 
he/she is unbanked. The distinction is important for our debate on the cashless society 
because, as I will explain later, only banknotes are a payment method and a source of money 
at the same time.46 Hence, only banknotes can guarantee equal access to payments to all 
individuals.  
 
B. Access to The Payment System 
As a subset of financial inclusion, monetary inclusion deals primarily with access to financial 
services. More precisely, it deals with individuals’ access to the payment system. Payment 
mechanisms are those sets of rules, procedures, institutions, infrastructures and 
technologies that enable the settlement of financial transactions.47 Examples of payment 
methods include banknotes and coins, cheques, debit and credit cards, electronic fund 
transfers, or digital wallets.48 Because of their key economic function, payments are usually 
considered the most essential financial service. Indeed, they are used by the quasi-totality 
of the population to transfer value, from the simple act of buying milk to the purchase of a 
house.49 The availability of payment instruments to discharge debt obligations is therefore 
 
45 These are the three classical functions of money according to the economic literature. See Micheal 
McLeay, Amar Radia & Ryland Thomas, Money in the Modern Economy: An Introduction, (Q1 Bank of 
Engl. Quarterly Bulletin) March 14, 2014 at 9. 
46 ROSS CRANSTON ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 362-63 (3rd ed. 2018); SIMON 
GLEESON, THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF MONEY 14-15 (2019).  
47 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: PAYMENTS, SECURITIES, 
DERIVATIVES, AND THE ROLE OF THE EUROSYSTEM 25 (Tom Kokkola ed. 2010). 
48 BIS, Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the United Kingdom, (BCBS Committee Report on 
Payment and Settlement System) 2012. 
49 For instance, in the hierarchy of demand of financial products, payments are required by 100% of 
the population. See Committee on Digital Payments, Medium Term Recommendations to Strengthen the 
Digital Payments Ecosystem: Report, MIN. OF FIN. GOVT. OF INDIA December 2016 at 28.  
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indispensable for individuals and firms, as it enables them to participate actively in the 
economy as both consumers and traders.  
Enabling access to the payment system requires the presence of two interrelated elements. 
First, on a macro-level, it requires the presence of a network of ‘payment points’ that enable 
payers to transfer monetary value to the highest number of payees. Second, at the micro-
level, it necessitates the elimination of all those physical, technological, and legal 
impediments that prevent payers from using a particular payment method. I will now 
examine them.   
 
1. Achieving Network Externalities 
The key element for the success of a monetary system is the presence of a network that 
connects as many users as possible. The literature demonstrates that there are direct 
network effects and economies of scale associated with money and payments.50 The main 
function of money and payments is to connect two end users of a monetary transaction who 
would otherwise be unable to settle their debts (because of distance, let’s say). Because both 
payer and payee need to participate in the network in order for the transaction to work, the 
efficiency of a monetary system is directly correlated to the size of the network it can rely 
on.51 Thus, payers will be more likely to use a type of money and a payment network that 
allows them to connect with the highest number of users, and thus perform their transaction 
more efficiently. We can describe these network externalities as the beneficial effects that 
any additional user of a payment network brings to all other users of the network.52 Hence, 
the more users choose a given payment method for their transactions, the more those users 
will benefit from it. Network externalities do not exist only in payments but can also be 
found in other industries such as digital platforms and e-commerce, to mention just a few. 
The development of networks, however, presents two fundamental problems, which explain 
why State’s involvement is essential. The first is that networks might not arise naturally. If 
that is the case, individuals and firms that need to transfer money to a payee who is not part 
of their monetary system, might be unable to do so or might have to pay a fee. In order to 
develop a network, regulation is sometimes essential. We will see in the next sections that 
the State has historically played a major role in monopolizing the control of the monetary 
and payment network, thus creating the network that money needs to function. It did so by 
centralizing the issuance of banknotes by the central bank, and by acquiring a monopolistic 
role in setting the monetary policy. Moreover, central banks have also acquired a central 
 
50 John A. Weinberg, Network Externalities and Public Goods in Payment Systems, RES. DEPT. FED. 
RES. BANK OF RICHMND November 1996. 
51 For general treatments of network effects that discuss legal and regulatory implications, see Mark 
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Effects 86 California Law Review 479 (1998); 
Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, in THE NEW 
ECONOMY AND BEYOND: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (Dennis W. Jansen ed. 2006). 
52 Weinberg, supra note 50. 
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position in the inter-bank payment systems, (both small-value and high-value), which have 
enabled the creation of the modern payment system and sustained its substantial coverage.53  
The second problem is that network-based systems tend to lead to monopolies or 
oligopolies.54 Competition law teaches us that when a firm reaches a position of dominance, 
it might restrict or make access more expensive. This is typical with certain services such as 
energy, transport, and water, which for this reason are tightly regulated and required to offer 
universal access. This is the key problem of financial access to payments. As long as money 
supply is guaranteed by the State, for instance through the issuance of banknotes, which do 
not pose particular access requirements, there is limited risk of exclusion. However, as long 
as money is issued by private institutions as in the case of bank deposits, and as long as the 
payment system that transmits money is controlled by payment firms, the question of access 
becomes a regulatory problem. As I will argue later, paradoxically, while regulation was 
trying to make money issuers stronger and safer, especially banks, it also raised a number of 
barriers to access for individuals, who were left out of the banking and, thus, monetary 
system. 
 
2. Users’ Discriminations 
Creating a network, however, is not enough to guarantee universal access to payments. It is 
also necessary to remove those direct or indirect barriers that sometimes prevents certain 
users from accessing a particular payment mechanism. In modern economies, retail 
payments are intermediated mostly by private institutions. Banks, credit card companies, 
ATM providers were for a long time the main players in the payment market. In the emerging 
cashless economy, however, payment services are now offered also by a panoply of digital 
payment services such as Paypal or GooglePay, which compete for customers with the 
traditional payment service providers.  
The outsourcing of payment services to private institutions adds an additional layer of 
complexity to the quest for monetary access, as payment firms control the access 
requirements to their services. In market economies, finance is supplied in a regime of 
competition between firms. This means that, in principle, payments operators are not 
obliged to offer their products to everybody, nor are they obliged to design their product in 
a way that suit the needs of all customers. For instance, while UK law mandates open access 
for payment services to guarantee the access to clearing and settlement services to small 
payment providers, there is no requirement of universal access to individuals. Constitutional 
protections such as the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution,55 or the 
Equality Act 2010 in the United Kingdom struggle to extend the coverage to discriminations 
 
53 Not surprisingly, countries like Sweden or China, both of which have well established electronic 
payment networks are at the forefront of the war against cash. Alan Wheatley, Cash is Dead: Long Live 
Cash, 54 IMF FIN. DEV., no 2, 2017. 
54 Kokkola (ed), supra note 57, at 131-141. 
55 Frank Michelman, Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law: Explaining America away, 6 INTL J. 
CONS. L. (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees? 56 SYR. L. REV. 2005-2006 at 1. 
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based on the economic status of individuals.56 The exclusion of economic status as a 
protected characteristic in anti-discrimination laws makes it more difficult for poor 
customers to receive affordable or accessible finance.57 While on the one hand, banks and 
payment intermediaries cannot discriminate on the basis of race or gender or refuse to open 
bank accounts for individuals legally residing in the UK or in the EU.58 On the other hand, 
they can still price financial services according to market risks, thus refusing to offer cheap 
credit to consumers with poor credit scores, or disinvest from unprofitable geographical 
areas or services, thereby leaving certain groups with no access to finance. 59 It is precisely 
these market dynamics of banking and payments services that need to be addressed.  
 
C. Access to Monetary Value 
Sometimes, monetary exclusion is the consequence of an individual’s exclusion from the 
banking system. The interplay between banking inclusion and access to payment methods 
is particularly important in the overall analysis of monetary inclusion. Indeed, modern 
payment methods, including electronic bank transfers, credit cards, and the various new 
digital payments app, require access to bank accounts to work. Only a very tiny minority of 
cashless transactions are indeed performed with cryptocurrencies. Thus, an individual who 
is unbanked and relies only on cash would be automatically excluded from the payment 
system.  
In order to understand this interplay, it is necessary to explain what money is in 
contemporary economies. Money is a socio-economic concept that defines a claim usually 
expressed in the form of a physical token or verifiable record that is accepted as payment in 
discharge of debts either by virtue of the law or by mutual agreement of the parties.60 From 
a financial perspective, money is, essentially, debt.61 Or in the words of the Bank of England, 
‘just a special form of IOU’.62 As I will show in the next sections, over the last three centuries, 
this IOU has been issued primarily by two institutions: private banks, and central banks.  
 
1. Central Bank Notes 
Central banks issue state-backed money in the form of central bank reserves and 
banknotes.63 While the former is outside the scope of this analysis as it is a form of money 
 
56 Kate Malleson, Equality Law and the Protected Characteristics, 81 MOD L. REV. 2018 at 598, 611-615. 
57 Id. 
58 Council Directive 2014/92/EU, 2014 O.J. (L257/214). 
59 BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS, supra note 26. 
60 In English law, there is no definition of ‘money’ as such, but only of ‘coins’ and ‘banknotes’ in the 
Currency and Bank Notes Act 1954 (c. 12) s. 1(1)-(4), and ‘electronic money’ in the Electronic Money 
Regulations 2011, s 2.  
61 GLEESON, supra note 46, ch 3. 
62 McLeay, supra note 45, at 3. 
63 Michael McLeay, Amar Radia & Ryland Thomas, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, (Q1 Bank 
of Engl. Quarterly Bulletin) March 14, 2014 at 14; MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: 
RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016). 
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available only to a few select commercial banks, the latter is of particular importance due to 
its widespread availability for individuals and firms. As I will demonstrate, banknotes are 
the form of money with the lowest barriers to access. The fact that central banks back their 
value protect them from credit risks. Secondly, because of their characteristics of 
negotiability and anonymity, banknotes can be intermediated by anyone. In one of the key 
cases in the English common law of finance, Moss v Hancock, money is defined as “that which 
passes freely from hand to hand in the community in final discharge of debts and full 
payment of commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the character or 
credit of the person who offers it…”.64  The concept of equality is a key, albeit rarely 
discussed, element in the law of money. As the judgment clearly spells out, the irrelevance 
of the social or economic conditions of the payer is a fundamental characteristic for any type 
of medium of exchange that aims at being universal, from coins to bitcoin. The lack of 
reference to the individual who tenders banknotes in payment of debt served precisely to 
eliminate the risks that social or economic barriers to the usage of money might reduce the 
network effects money relies on, thereby enabling it to be universal. Only by guaranteeing 
total equality among users, can money exert its fundamental economic and social functions 
of medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account.65  
 
2. Bank Deposits 
Banks too create money in the form of bank deposits that are intermediated through the 
bank payment system to extinguish debt obligations among depositors.66 As any textbook on 
banking law says, bank deposits are nothing more than a loan that the depositors make to 
the bank, which is in turn obliged to return it to the client at any time upon his request.67 
Bank money, however, present two fundamental problems. First, as the vast literature on 
financial exclusion demonstrates, banks are prone to the very same problem of access and 
discrimination that we have seen earlier with payment systems. Thus, individuals who do 
not fit the criteria set by the bank for the opening of a deposit account can be left out of the 
banking system. Secondly, bank deposits leave money holders exposed to the solvency risk 
of the entity that issued the money, or to price fluctuations that reflect the issuer’s 
underlying credit conditions. From an economic perspective, a monetary system is credible 
only to the extent that the entities issuing it are able to meet the credit demand. Indeed, the 
higher the risk of monetary depreciation, the lower the ability of ordinary individuals to use 
a particular type of money for their commercial transactions. As I will show in the next 
section, this was the key problem of early private bank notes. For this reason, one of the key 
regulatory objectives of monetary access is to guarantee the solvability of the entities that 
had the privilege to issue money. Since money is a debt, only those institutions that could 
 
64 Moss v Hancock, [1899] 2 QB 111, 116, 
65 These are the three classical functions of money according to the economic literature. See McLeay, 
supra note 45. 
66 Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017); 
McLeay, supra note 63; Ricks, supra note 63. 
67 See for instance, CRANSTON ET AL., supra note 46, at 190-192. 
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guarantee that their debts could be met at any point in time, had the right to create money. 
Central banks rely on the backing of the State and have a statutory privilege to print money 
limitlessly, and a variety of monetary policy tools to control the price of money in the 
economy (even though they are not always successful in that).68 Banks are subject to a 
number of licencing and prudential requirements that limit their money creation function 
and reduce their risks of illiquidity and insolvency.69 More complex is the question regarding 
digital money issuers, who are only now starting to be regulated, albeit in a much less 
intrusive way than standard banks.  
Before concluding, it is important to notice that the central bank money and bank deposits 
are not the only sources of money. This historical duopoly is now challenged by new 
entrants. On the one hand, shadow banking entities such as Repo lenders or money market 
funds, are now issuing their own form of money that are used predominantly by 
corporations.70 Since this essay deals only with individuals’ access to the monetary system, 
I will not discuss shadow banks. More importantly for our analysis, for what concerns 
mainstream and retail payments, a panoply of new entities are now able to issue their own 
cryptocurrencies relying on software-based solutions and platforms. While cryptocurrencies 
are undoubtedly an important form of money, they only occupy a minuscule fraction of the 
retail payment system. For this reason, they are not included in the analysis.  
 
III. BANKNOTES AND PAYMENTS EQUALITY 
In light of the discussion above, it is now time to review in detail how monetary access was 
guaranteed in history, and the role of the State in this process.71 More than any other aspect 
of finance, payments have been constantly evolving, from simple coins to letters of credit 
and, eventually, credit cards. Yet, one particular method of payment, the banknote, has 
acquired a particular place in modern societies.72 Its particular legal and financial attributes 
make it a very convenient monetary tool, used by rich and poor alike. As I will demonstrate 
in this section, the success of banknotes has also a lot to do with the critical role played by 
 
68 CHARLES GOODHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS (1988); ROSA M. LASTRA, 
CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION (1996). 
69 KERN ALEXANDER, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING REGULATION (2019). 
70 Hockett, supra note 66; Ricks, supra note 63; GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE 
HANDS: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010). 
71 For an excellent overview of modern legal monetary history, see MONEY IN THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 
2015).  
72 For a discussion on the earlier type of transferable money, see Benjamin Geva, Bank Money: The 
Rise, Fall, and Metamorphosis of the ‘Transferrable Deposit’, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2015); 
James Steven Rogers, Early English Law on Checks, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2015); 
James Steven Rogers, Early English Law on Bank Notes, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2015). 
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the State, through its central bank, as controller of the currency and ultimate creditor.73 A 
critical role that, as I will show in the following section, is very difficult to replicate in a 
cashless society.  
 
A. The Inefficiency of the Private Bank Notes74  
In order to understand the specific role exerted by the State in monetary affairs, and with 
regard to money in particular, it is first necessary to start from the time when money was a 
private financial product. While modern monetary systems have established money supply 
as a (mostly) public function in the hands of central banks, the history of money has 
witnessed long periods in which money was a private business.75 In the 19th century, during 
the ‘free banking’ period, a new form of payment, the bank note, was created.76 Unlike now, 
bank notes were issued individually by commercial banks instead of the central bank, and 
were backed by an equal amount of commodity money (gold and silver) that could be 
redeemed by the note holder in one of the issuing bank’s branches. In practice, individuals 
were paying goods and services with notes from different banks. Unlike commodity 
currency, whose value reflected the value of the metal it was made with, bank notes 
depended totally on the solvability of the issuing bank. While mechanisms were put in place 
to minimize the risk of frauds or defaults, ultimately the efficiency of the private currency 
system relied on the business acumen of the bank itself. As Walter Bagehot acutely observed 
in Lombard Street: 
‘A bank of issue, which need not pay its notes in cash, has a charmed life; it can lend 
what it wishes, and issue what it likes, with no fear of harm to itself, and with no 
substantial check but its own inclination.’77 
 
The redemption costs inherent in the fact that notes could be redeemed only at the issuing 
bank made them trade at values below par (i.e., at a price lower than its face value).78 Thus, 
while the note was issued for a specific amount – let’s say, 10 Dollars – it was actually 
accepted for a lower value. In the US, the devaluing effect was made worse by the fact that 
notes could be redeemed by law only in the State where the bank was registered. In order 
to facilitate monetary exchange, banks eventually established arrangements allowing holders 
 
73 See GOODHART, supra note 68; Francois Gianviti, The Objectives of Central banks, in 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: THE GLOBAL CRISIS (Mario Giovanoli 
& Diego Devos eds., 2010). 
74 In this essay, I will refer to notes issued by private banks as ‘bank notes’ to distinguish them from 
the modern central bank ‘banknotes’.  
75 For an overview of the early UK bank notes, see, Rogers, Early English Law on Bank Notes, supra 
note 72. 
76 The free banking era was a prominent feature of the US system where no central bank existed, and 
to a lesser extent of the UK, where the Bank of England had already acquired the task issuing of Bank 
of England banknotes alongside private banks.  
77 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 54 
(12th ed. 2015). 
78 Gary Gorton, Pricing Free Bank Notes, 44 J. MONETARY ECONS., Aug. 1999 at 33. 
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to redeem notes issued by partner banks, while the banks’ mutual debts would then be 
settled through clearinghouses.79 Yet, private note holders had to have faith that either the 
issuing bank would have enough funds to redeem the note if requested to do so or, more 
often, that their future payees and the society at large would trust the note as valid and worth 
not less than what the payer originally accepted it for. In this era, weak consumer protection 
and bank supervision frameworks often led to consumer frauds, mostly when a bank’s 
outstanding monetary liabilities were much higher than its reserves, or because of note 
forgeries. For instance, in the US during the free banking era between 1830 and 1863, when 
entry restrictions for banks were lifted, entry controls on banks were so limited that frauds 
and insolvencies skyrocketed.80 It was precisely as a reaction to the weaknesses of this model 
that national currencies were adopted.  
At roughly the same time, and especially after the creation of Joint-Stock banks in 1826, 
goldsmith banks began to evolve quickly from paymasters and deposit taking institutions 
into the modern banks we see today.81 This meant that banks could not only issue bank notes 
and take deposit, but they also acquired the ability to create money in the form of loans 
issued to borrowers. Similarly, to the issuance of private bank notes, also the issuance of 
commercial bank money depended on the credit-worthiness of the bank and its ability to 
manage its reserves, but unlike private banknotes, the lending function of banks was much 
riskier. Indeed, banks did not need to back loans with 100% deposits – what economists call 
‘full reserve banking’ – but were essentially free to keep the minimum amount of liquidity 
that allowed them to meet depositors’ demands.82 Not surprisingly, not all banks were so 
skilled in managing the process of maturity transformation to avoid illiquidity. Thus, until 
the mechanisms of bank supervision and lending controls were tightened, bank runs and 
insolvencies were the order of the day.83  
 
B. The Genius of (Central) Banknotes 
In a monetary system in which only a handful of individuals had bank accounts, bank notes 
necessarily were the main means of payment for the majority of the population. Yet, in a 
free monetary system such as the one we described earlier, payees receiving a private bank 
note in discharge of a debtor’s obligation were assuming an immediate credit risk. While 
payment with a bank note achieved finality in a legal sense – thus immediately and 
irrevocably discharging the payer’s debt obligation – it did not necessarily guarantee credit 
 
79 The clearest example in this regard is the Suffolk Bank in New England, which de facto acted as a 
quasi-central bank for smaller banks in the region, offering clearinghouse and reserve deposit 
services. See GEORGE TRIVOLI, THE SUFFOLK BANK: A STUDY OF A FREE-ENTERPRISE 
CLEARING SYSTEM (1979); GOODHART, supra note 68, at 31-36.  
80 GARY GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM 
COMING (2012). 
81 Victoria Barnes & Lucy Newton, The Introduction of the Joint-Stock Company in English Banking and 
Monetary Policy, (Henley Business School International Business History, Discussion Paper No. IBH-
2016-01, 2016). 
82 Adam Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (2016). 
83 GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 80. 
 17 
extinction from a practical financial perspective. More specifically, it did not guarantee the 
payer an increase in monetary assets, which instead could only be achieved if, and when, 
the note was accepted by a future payee in discharge of the tenderer’s debt.  
Indeed, in a private monetary system in which the value of the note is not fixed by the State, 
the monetary value of a bank note can just be equal to the value that a future payee will 
attribute to it. Thus, when considering whether to accept a note in discharge of a debt, a 
payee would have had to consider the various risks that might render the note unusable or 
less valuable in the future. These risks include the possibility of forgery, the transaction 
costs of redeeming the private note at the issuing bank, which includes the non-negligible 
costs of travel, and the always existent risk that the issuing bank might not be solvent. While 
the note holder might have tried to avoid these risks by tendering the note to another payee 
in discharge of its debt, the reality of commerce – that the note would have to be discharged 
at one point, if not for wear and tear - would have to be faced at some point.84 
Thus, the private bank note system was plagued by information asymmetries – not knowing 
whether the issuing bank had issued the note with enough assets to back it, or whether it 
was forged, or whether it would be accepted by a future payee in discharge of a debt. The 
ultimate outcome was that, while private bank notes achieved finality in legal terms, they 
obtained the opposite from a financial perspective. The payer was assuming a credit risk 
when accepting bank notes. Moreover, the high transaction costs of checking the note or 
the costs of travel made them inevitably trade at below par with substantial costs for the 
users. For instance, in the US, before accepting a note, the payee would have had to consult 
the ‘Bank Note Reporter’, a document listing the up-to-date value of each private bank note 
circulating in the country.85 This created a complex and uncertain bank notes market in 
which payments were a hindrance to commerce rather than a means to facilitate it.  
The inefficiencies of the private money market led to the progressive centralization of the 
monetary and payment system, including the issuance of notes, in the hands of the State.86 
Initially, the increased credit risks coming from counterfeit notes and the sometimes-
reckless behaviour of note-issuing banks, led to the allocation of the bank notes issuance 
function to a few trusted banks – the issuing institutions – that had the mandate to organize 
the orderly and safe issuance of bank notes on behalf of the government.87 Eventually, the 
process was progressively centralized into one single institution - the central bank.88 Central 
banks became central in the monetary and payment system as they acted as guarantor of the 
 
84 GLEESON, supra note 46, at 77. 
85 Id, at 23. 
86 See Helmut Siekman, Deposit Banking and the Use of Monetary Instruments, in MONEY IN THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS (David Fox & 
Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2015). 
87 Kokkola (ed), supra note 57, at 152. 
88 For instance, the last private bank note was issued by Fox & co. of Wellington in 1922. See Roger 
Outing, An Introduction to English Banking History, THE BRITISH MUSEUM, 
https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/publications/online_research_catalogues/paper_money/pa
per_money_of_england__wales/english_banking_history.aspx  (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).  
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stability of the payment system for all other banks, thus taking up central clearing functions, 
lending of last resort, and deposit taking for private banks. 89   
Moreover, central banks took up the fundamental function of converting private bank notes 
into central bank notes or central bank deposits at par. The convertibility at par of private 
bank notes was essential to guarantee the stability of the system in that period as it eliminates 
the credit risks and high transaction costs that arise when multiple private issuers issue notes 
that are exchanged at different values. The same function remains today when a bank 
depositor withdraws cash from its banks, thus exchanging deposits for cash.90 Even now, 
one of the main benefits of cash is that it does not entail any counterparty risk. This means 
that holders of banknotes do not need to worry about the solvability of the issuer, which we 
saw was a critical problem with private bank notes. Even though inflation might over time 
erode the purchasing power of notes, thus reducing the incentive for saving in cash rather 
than interest-bearing bank deposits, central banks do strive to keep prices low, thereby 
reducing the risk that the value of the note will decrease in real terms. Cash payments are 
final and immediately settled as there is no credit relationship between payor and payee. 
For this reason, as long as users trust the central bank in managing a stable inflation, cash 
guarantees solvability. 
Another fundamental problem of private bank notes was that they could not rely on a wide 
network. In order to increase the acceptance and usage of central-bank notes as the main 
currency in circulation, states made them legal tender.91 Title 31 of the U.S. Code stipulates:  
 
“United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating 
notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, 
public charges, taxes, and dues."92  
 
This legal concept defines the attribute that a payment instrument has when, by law rather 
than agreement of the parties, it discharges the payer’s obligation, without any possibility 
for the payee to reject it when tendered as a payment.93 More specifically, when currency is 
given legal tender status, the payer can use it as payment in discharge of an obligation, 
knowing that the payee cannot sue for the debt or rely on the remedies for non-payment.94 
The practical relevance of legal tender is now surpassed by practice, as in both US law and 
English law parties can negotiate in the contract for payment to be discharged by any 
method, and by the fact that courts now imply that payments be made in a commercially 
 
89 Kokkola (ed), supra note 57, at 152-153. 
90 Bank for International Settlements, The Role of Central Bank Money in Payment Systems, (BIS 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems Report) 2003 at 8. 
91 See Legal Tender, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
92 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018)  
93 On the concept of legal tender, see GLEESON, supra note 46, at 133-143. 
94 Id, at 134. 
 19 
sensible way.95 Yet, in the transition from a private to a public monetary system, giving 
central bank notes legal tender status was essential.  
First of all, legal tender solved the information asymmetries of private payment systems. By 
giving legal certainty that the note could not be rejected as payment in discharge of debt, 
payers had confidence that they could accept the note without much credit risk – except for 
the risk of forgery. Moreover, the fact that legal tender could be redeemed at par, in exchange 
for bank deposits or specie reduced the discount costs of the note to zero, thereby 
eliminating the inefficiencies of the previous system in which the same note could be traded 
at multiple values depending on the location. Moreover, the attribution of legal tender to 
central bank notes, allowed them to achieve the network externalities that a successful 
payment system requires, thus guaranteeing a large group of users. This was particularly 
important in the period up until the end of the 19th century where central bank and 
commercial bank notes were still circulating alongside each other.96 In sum, while legal 
tender does not amount to a prohibition of all other forms of money and payments - and 
indeed various economists agree that in many instances where national currency was 
declared legal tender, citizens nevertheless still adopted unofficial means of payments - it 
nonetheless gives a ‘boost’ to currency with that status.97  
 
C.  Cash as A Social Equalizer 
Until the early 20th century, banknotes were the standard form of payment for most people.98 
What made them so popular was that they did not require the note holder to have a bank 
account to use them. Although cash ultimately presumes the presence of the banking system 
underneath it and a distribution network to disperse it across the territory, not all users of 
cash need to have a direct relationship with a bank through a bank account. What cash 
needs instead is that its users have trust in the entity backing it: the government. The belief 
that the piece of paper in their hand is not counterfeited and will not lose its purchasing 
power over time. Not surprisingly, because of its detachment from the banking system and 
its anonymity, cash is used by both criminals and children; neither of whom rely on a 
previous bank account.  
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The legal genius of negotiable instruments – including banknotes - was indeed that their 
physical possession equalled their property right. Cash is indeed the property of whoever 
holds it, as it relies only on the promise to pay embedded in the note.99 It was this very basic 
concept that enabled the modern cash system to work so efficiently as a universal payment 
mechanism for rich and poor. It meant that the simple possession of the note is enough. 
Moreover, since the note was widely accepted as a medium of exchange, the holder could 
simply use it to discharge his personal obligations with other persons without converting it. 
For this reason, cash payments are instantaneous and final, and are perfect for one-to-one 
small retail transactions of the type common among poor where certainty is key.100 Moreover, 
cash does not require any form of identification, which is a fundamental criterion to access 
a bank account. In this regard, a wide policy literature shows that strict identification 
requirements do reduce financial inclusion as most unbanked individuals do not hold 
official identification cards.101  
Despite the increased use of more technologically advanced payment methods such as debit 
or credit cards, in most societies, until few years ago, cash was still the most common form 
of small retail payments.102 There is limited behavioural economics literature on the usage 
of cash and why people tend to prefer it for certain transactions.103 Unlike digital payments 
and standard banking, cash does not require a basic level of financial literacy, which has 
proven to constitute a major barrier to financial inclusion.104 Banknotes and coins are widely 
understood by everyone and do not require prior understanding of how bank accounts work 
or familiarity with mobile technology.105 Not surprisingly, unbanked individuals often 
consider cash as superior to bank deposits as a form of saving, especially in financial systems 
where banking crises are widespread and consumer protection legislation is weaker.106 
Moreover, the same studies show that cash has always been the favoured payment 
mechanism of the poor. This is because it offers a cheap alternative to the traditional 
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banking-centric system from which a large proportion of individuals are excluded, especially 
in developing countries. 107  
To conclude, it is easy to see how cash is the vehicle through which everyone, rich or poor, 
banked or unbanked, is able to exert their trading role in the economy. In this light, we can 
appreciate the role of the State as the guarantor of the cash in circulation. The monopoly 
function of the central bank in issuing notes serves to provide a last resort payment 
mechanism for those who do not have a bank account. The State addresses the inefficiency 
of private payment mechanisms, which rely on private contractual liabilities between banks 
and their customers and, for this reason, impose a cost on the public in terms of fees and 
liquidity risks. It does so by taking upon itself the liability of currency in circulation among 
the population, which is free to transfer liabilities among themselves with no liquidity risks 
of the likes we see in bank deposits. In sum, by issuing cash, the central bank internalizes 
the negative externalities of private payment mechanisms and addresses the problems of 
financial exclusion. Ultimately, the role exerted by the banking system (including the central 
bank) in issuing notes and managing cash is the closest we can get to a public utility.108 This 
function is particularly important in the context of our analysis as I will argue that the same 
function should be preserved in the transition towards a cashless system. 
 
IV. BANK MONEY AND INCLUSION 
The progressive expansion and depth of the banking system throughout the 20th century 
propelled seismic changes in the structure of the retail payment system. This structural 
evolution reduced the relative importance of banknotes as the main form of money and 
increased that of bank deposits. Since the 1970s, evolutions in payment services such as the 
ATM, credit and debit cards, and electronic bank payments, made cheques and banknotes 
more expensive and, conversely, bank accounts central in the mechanics of payment.109 The 
increased centrality of bank deposit as the main form of money, however, shifted control 
over the access to the monetary and payment network from the State to the private banking 
sector. In a system where money was again issued by banks, it was the market, and not the 
State that influenced the level of access to the monetary system for individuals. The ultimate 
outcome was that access to retail payments became more challenging for a minority of users, 
who were left out of the banking system.  
 
A. The Shift Towards Bank Deposits  
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Since the 20th century, bank deposits have become more and more widespread among the 
general public due to the improved regulatory framework, enhanced supervision, and the 
extended reach of the banking system which was able to cater the large majority of the 
population. Individuals were increasingly able to open basic transaction accounts into which 
they could receive salaries and organize savings. The increased availability of bank deposits, 
coupled with technological innovations, propelled a series of improvements in retail 
payments which led to a progressive reduction in the number and volume of cash 
transactions in favour of bank deposit-based electronic payments.  
In a very influential essay, ‘Commercial Banks as Creators of Money’, Nobel Prize winning 
economist James Tobin advanced the idea that modern banks create money, not by issuing 
notes as they used to, but by creating demand deposits. This view, which was against the 
standard approach seeing only currency as money, saw banks regaining centrality in the 
money creation business, this time simply by adjusting the banks accounting records. What 
Tobin and other economists called ‘fountain pen money’.110 Without delving into the 
technicalities of how banks’ balance sheets lead to money creation, the view that bank 
deposit accounts act as widely acceptable means of payments is now widely accepted by 
economists and central banks.111 According to Bank of England statistics, studies show that 
at present, the UK monetary base is made 97% by bank deposits, and only 3% by currency.112 
The shift from cash to bank deposit as the main form of money implied an increased role of 
banks as the main centre of gravity for the payment system to the detriment of the State. 
Indeed, in a cash-based system, the central bank has a fundamental role in the issuance of 
banknotes and in the oversight of the note distribution system. Central banks are in charge 
of printing, collecting, and controlling the value of the notes.113 Moreover, given that a 
banknote is a claim against the central bank and that the value of the note is set and 
controlled by the government, only the State is responsible for ensuring equality of access 
of individuals to the cash monetary system. However, the more money takes the form of 
bank deposit as opposed to banknotes, the higher the relative importance of private banks 
both as money makers, as well as gatekeepers for access to the payment system. 
 
B. Financial Deepening and Financial Exclusion  
This entailed two fundamental changes in the relationship between individuals and money. 
First, individuals took up more credit risks. As the previous sections showed, when money 
is issued and intermediated privately by banks, money entails an inherent credit risk. For 
this reason, controlling the stability of the banking system became an even more central 
objective of banking and monetary policy. The use of deposit insurance reduces this risk 
substantially, as the government-backed fund guarantees losses up to a certain amount – 
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which in the United States is about $250,000.114 Nevertheless, over that threshold, depositors 
assume the full risk that their money might be lost in the event of the bank’s insolvency. 
The risk has further increased since the new bank resolution rules treat deposits like any 
other bank debt and, in theory, make it subject to bail-in.115  
At the same time, while the widespread availability of bank deposits brought clear benefits 
in terms of increased credit opportunities, it did nonetheless create a barrier to access of the 
retail payment system. Indeed, the retail payment system that emerged from the 19th century 
and still exists today is fundamentally bank-centric. It relies on a system of clearing and 
settlement among banks, mostly done at the central bank, which allow the transfers of bank 
clients’ money through the banks’ respective crediting and debiting of deposit accounts.116 
Payment instructions were typically done with paper and, later on, with telex. However, 
technological innovations in the transmission of payment instructions, such as SWIFT, 
made the process of transferring money very quickly.117 The trend continued with the launch 
of credit cards in the 1980s, which made cheques obsolete, but it really took off with the 
advent of the internet and, more recently, mobile phones, which I will discuss in the next 
section.118  
In a payment system in which bank deposits are central, individuals’ access to the banking 
system is critical as only those who have access to the banking system – more specifically, 
the access to a deposit account - can intermediate bank deposits. A monetary system that 
mostly rests on bank deposits works efficiently insofar as everyone has access to a bank 
account. Yet, from a regulatory perspective, for a long time, very little was done to foster 
access to the banking system.  
According to the latest 2018 statistics, around 25 million people in the United States remain 
unbanked. 119A staggering amount, if we consider that they count for almost 7.5% of the U.S. 
population. Disappointing results are present also in the United Kingdom, where 1.7 million 
adults still do not have a bank account.120 In her illuminating study on social discrimination 
in banking, Mehrsa Baradaran showed that minorities and low-income families are 
disproportionally affected by financial exclusion.121 In a 2017 Federal Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation’s survey, almost 17% of Black households and 14% of Hispanic households do 
not have access to a bank account.122  
Studies show that this is due to a mix of problems. First, unlike cash, bank deposits are 
subject to strict identification requirements, which force banks to reject applicants who do 
not satisfy the criteria.123 As part of the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT, banks are now required 
to collect information about their customers before opening a bank account - what is called 
Know Your Customer (KYC).124 A similar policy is adopted in the UK and all western 
countries. Crucially, KYC requires applicants to provide their Social Security number, date 
of birth, address, proof of citizenship or right to live in the country, credit history, and other 
personal data. As showed by various studies, this proof of identification is one of the key 
stumbling blocks for minorities, illegal migrants, and poor individuals from accessing the 
banking system.125 Indeed, many of them do not have proof of residence and some of them 
are in the country illegally. Second, unlike cash, bank deposits and card-based payments 
linked to bank deposits incur a cost for users. In the US, various studies showed that banks 
and financial service providers find servicing low-balance accounts very unprofitable.126 On 
average, it costs banks between $250 and $400 to establish a new checking account and 
another several hundred dollars to maintain it each year on average.127  
 
C. The Rising Cost of Cash and Monetary Exclusion 
The second seismic change that shook the monetary system was the progressive decline of 
the use and importance of banknotes.128 This was due to a combination of factors. 
First, cash is under increasing scrutiny because of its role in illegal activities. Indeed, the 
anonymity of cash, its lack of traceability, the ease with which it can be stored and 
transported, especially with large denomination banknotes, makes it the number one saving 
and payment instrument for criminals.129 A number of studies demonstrate that cash is used 
to finance terrorist activities, corruption, drug trade, money laundering, or human 
trafficking.130 Moreover, on a smaller scale, payments with cash can facilitate tax evasion as 
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small banknotes can be exchanged undetected and outside the radars of tax enforcement 
authorities. For instance, in the US alone, it was estimated that cash payments led to a 14.6% 
tax gap.131 
Second, innovations in payment methods since the 1950s have increased the cost of cash.132 
First of all, cash is a very expensive form of payment from a technical perspective.133 Central 
banks have to print the notes and make sure that they cannot be counterfeited. Notes must 
then be collected and distributed to various banks, which have to manage their distribution 
across the network of branches and various ATMs.134 All this entails costs for the banks and 
the various cash operators. Moreover, notes must be changed periodically by the central 
bank when they become worn-out.135 In the UK, estimates put the overall cost of cash from 
£5billion to £9billion per year.136 In a 2013 TUFTS University study, Chakravorti and 
Mazzotta estimate the costs of cash for US stakeholders to be around $400 Billion.137 Even 
though these costs are mostly shared by the central bank, private banks, and merchants, 
consumers too pay their fair share.138 Indeed, the government recoups the costs of printing 
and managing the notes through seigniorage and by charging interest rates on the banks’ 
deposits at the central bank,139 while private banks transfer the costs of distributing cash 
through the ATM network onto their depositors through debit card charges and other 
indirect fees.140  
The fact that cash places the burden of maintaining the payment infrastructure on third 
parties rather than on the direct holder makes the usage of cash extremely cheap compared 
to other options such as bank deposits or credit cards. For these reasons, banks in western 
countries, including the UK and the US, are increasingly moving away from cash by 
reducing their network of branches and ATMs, and by focusing all their marketing efforts 
on promoting non-cash payment products, such as debit cards, bank transfers, and the 
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various digital payment apps.141 This has led to such a fast disappearance of ATMs, especially 
in rural communities, that in certain countries the Central Bank had to intervene to 
discourage banks from eliminating their cash-related services.142  
This created a problem of financial exclusion that affected a minority of the population who 
did not have access to the standard banking system. For them, using cash became extremely 
expensive. Studies show that in western countries unbanked individuals pay a premium for 
every transaction.  Indeed, a standard non-cash payment almost requires the payer and the 
payee to be banked – i.e., to have a bank account – if they do not want to pay excessive fees 
for their payments to be processed. In a recent book, Candice Choi, a New York journalist 
who tried to live for a month without a bank account, showed that the cost of being 
unbanked could be extremely high. Banks would charge a non-customer much higher fees 
compared to that charged to depositors, even if the transaction is of very low value.143 
Ultimately, unbanked individuals are forced to be paid in checks, which have to be 
converted in cash, always for a high fee. Retail stores, for instance, charge around 1.5% to 
3.5% of the face value of the checks.144 Moreover, if they need to transfer money, unbanked 
individuals need to rely on money-transfer services, such as Western Union, which typically 
charge much higher fees compared to banks. In an often-quoted study, Barr and Blank 
estimate that an unbanked individual with an annual income of $12,000 might end up paying 
around 2% to 5% of their annual income on payment fees alone.145  
In addition, as reported by the 2017 FDCI Survey, 18.7% of the U.S. households – a 
staggering sixty-five million individuals – are forced to access more expensive non-bank 
payment services despite having access to a bank account.146 These ‘underbanked’ 
households are forced to bypass the traditional banking payment network because they are 
mostly unable to access the services due to physical distance from the bank.147 Some 
commentators suggest that this is the result of the progressive disappearance of bank 
branches in rural areas.148 The phenomenon of ‘underbanking’ is nothing new. Since the 
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1980s, US financial regulatory agencies, individual States and the US Treasury Department 
have launched initiatives to expand the reach of deposit accounts.149 Programmes such as 
the Electronic Transfer Accounts, the First Accounts Program, Model Safe Accounts Pilot 
have tried to offer individuals basic bank deposit account services with minimum costs. 
However, for a variety of reasons, they never really took off.150  
 
V. DIGITAL FINANCIAL EXCLUSION 
The increased importance of digital payments added an additional layer of complexity to the 
debate of monetary inclusion. FinTech is almost unanimously welcomed as a smart solution 
to a variety of problems affecting the financial sector.151 Data show that 80% of the UK 
population, in one way or another, benefits from digital financial services.152 In developing 
countries, digital finance has been heralded as one of the key solutions to economic 
development. Payments, in particular, is probably the sector that was most impacted by the 
digital revolution, as it benefitted greatly from the complex technological interaction 
between financial and mobile technology.153 Companies such as PayPal, Venmo, or Wepay 
in China have established themselves as pillars of the new digital payment ecosystem, 
enabling individuals to make fast and cheap payments from their computer or mobile phone. 
Payments which, until not long ago, would have required a visit to the bank branch. The 
advent of the internet and the app-economy allowed banks to reach their customers through 
digital means, mostly through their computers and mobile phones. This reduced the need 
for depositors to use bank branches to conduct basic payments operations such as 
transferring money, withdrawing cash, or even depositing a cheque.154  
Yet, as I will demonstrate in this section, digital payment presents unique features that, 
while expanding access to payment services for the majority of users, nonetheless add 
further barriers of access for others. This latter group is the remaining 20% of the statistics 
that is not usually reported in the news. Without the possibility of using digital payment 
tools, alongside the rising costs of using cash, un-cashed individuals are pushed further on 
the verge of monetary exclusion.155 
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A. The Digital Financial Inclusion Myth 
One of the key arguments in favour of e-payment systems is that they increase financial 
inclusion.156 This basic argument posits that unbanked individuals who are unable, for 
geographical or administrative reasons to sign up for a bank account, will be able to access 
long-distance payment infrastructures through mobile phones.157 Thus, by bypassing the 
bank-centric payment system, they will be able to reduce their reliance on cash and the 
practical constraints that a cash-based economy imposes. The inclusion argument is behind 
the allure of mobile banking and e-payments, especially in developing countries. However, 
it is based on a fundamental misconception: that digital payment systems bypass the banking 
system. Nothing can be further from the truth. The reality is that digital payments are a 
parasitic system that necessarily relies on the existing monetary and banking system to 
work.158 In other words, it requires users to be financially included to work. In order to 
understand why, it is first necessary to explain the dynamics of e-payments accounts. 
 
1. Bank-to-Bank Cashless Payments 
There are roughly three types of e-payment transactions. The first type is e-payments that 
simply entail a transfer of bank deposits from one depositor to another through the use of a 
digital platforms. This typically can be performed through banks’ websites or apps. A recent 
evolution of internet payments is electronic wallets or ‘e-wallets’ such as Apple Pay or 
Android Pay, which are third-parties’ software applications usually available on phones or 
mobile devices. Unlike internet or mobile banking, e-wallets do not intermediate deposit 
money directly, but simply provide payment authorization data for credit cards or bank 
deposits accounts, thus acting as a traditional payment card.159 As succinctly described in a 
very influential financial law textbook, these services are simply “new technologies running on 
old rails”.160 
Unlike traditional payment cards, however, e-wallets can contain additional data, such as 
loyalty programmes, coupons, and offer geolocation services to transmit real-time 
information to the consumer.161 The bank-based model, which accounts for the large 
majority of e-payment transactions in the developed world, can then be developed further 
to accommodate the reality of rural villages, which suffer from less telecom and banking 
infrastructures. In developing countries, this entails the use of agents which, upon receiving 
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the electronic bank transfer, disburse cash, essentially acting as an ATM.162 Deposit-linked 
e-payments clearly do not bring any benefit to financial inclusion as they require users to 
already have a bank account to perform the transaction, thus relying on already existing 
deposit money. 
 
2. E-Money Cashless Payments 
More complex is the analysis of the second type of e-payment transaction, which entails the 
transfer of e-money rather than bank deposits. In simple words, e-money is a digital 
representation of money denominated in fiat currency that acts as a surrogate for coins or 
banknotes, to be used only for electronic payments. 163 In this case, the issuing institution, 
usually a telecom company or an independent payment provider such as PayPal, issues the 
virtual currency – the ‘e-money’ - in exchange for cash or deposit money.164  The e-money is 
then stored as a digital representation of value in a virtual account, which acts as a consumer 
card to be used for retail purchases. Also in this case, the e-wallet is nothing more than a 
service to store and visualize the quantity of e-money available to the user, and to perform 
payment transfer of e-money to other e-wallets holders.165 Even though e-money payment 
solutions seemingly operate outside of the bank-payment system and, for this reason, do not 
require the user to be subject to credit checks, they nonetheless need a banking system 
underneath. 166 From a monetary perspective, e-money payments do not actually create any 
additional monetary base, as the money already existed in the form of cash or prior deposit 
that is then converted. More simply, these e-payments swap existing money (mainly deposits) 
for electronic tokens which can be reconverted as cash or transferred to other customers. In 
essence, e-money payments offer a custodial service in which “real” money is stored and 
denominated in virtual currency. But nothing more.167  
 
3. Cryptocurrency Payments 
The third type of e-payment transactions entails the transfer of cryptocurrencies. Since the 
creation of Bitcoin in 2009, a number of cryptocurrencies such as Ripple or Ethereum have 
mushroomed.168 Unlike e-money, cryptocurrencies are digital representations of value 
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developed privately and denominated in their own unit of account.169 These currencies are 
developed as a parallel form of money totally independent from the state and can be used 
only among a restricted group of users for payment transactions.170 In theory, 
cryptocurrencies give rise to a new stateless form of money. However, there are two main 
objections to this argument. First, the large majority of cryptocurrencies in circulation are 
purchased by users with deposit money through the various virtual coin exchanges, and then 
cashed out or used to pay for services. This is no different than purchasing e-money, as 
discussed before. Second, even when virtual currencies are created ‘out of thin air’ – a 
process called ‘mining’ – they are actually financed with existing money.171 Indeed, mining 
entails a cost in terms of energy, which has to be paid somehow to the energy provider. 
Presumably, with real money. Moreover, since most cryptocurrencies have a limited total 
supply, their fees will soon be covered by the final users. Those fees could be quite high as 
the marginal cost of maintaining the digital monetary ecosystem will increase substantially 
as the total digital money base increases over time with the use.172 
Thus, the various digital payment instruments are nothing more than a super-structure that 
sits above and depends for its operations on the core payment system made of bank 
deposits.173 This leads us to conclude that e-payment systems do not provide the 
fundamental benefits of the real monetary system: credit creation. Yet, the financial 
inclusion myth has equivocated the cash security function of e-payments intermediaries, 
which somehow mirrors deposit taking, for the issuance of new money. The ugly truth is 
that, still, only central bank and licensed banks can do so. The former because of its statutory 
powers. The latter due to their unique role in the monetary system which allows them to 
generate loans, thus achieving the money multiplier effect that economic textbooks 
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describe.174 It is precisely this latter quality that makes banks so special and requires them to 
operate with a licence.175  
 
B. Behavioural Insights into Digital Payments 
Another critical aspect of digital payments is that they require a different mode of interaction 
with users. The new interface of digital payments, based on software solutions and mobile 
apps, while much easier to approach for the large majority of users, is nevertheless extremely 
difficult for a sizeable minority.  
Behavioural studies give a very interesting glimpse into the challenges that certain users face 
with regard to digital payments. First of all, while most of us take internet and digital 
products as a constant presence in daily life, there is a minority of the population that does 
not and is not comfortable with this trend. Recent data from the United Kingdom clearly 
show clearly that, as of 2019, there is still a substantial part of the population that is digitally 
illiterate. As of 2017, a quarter of UK households do not have access to broadband, while a 
tenth of the population has never used internet. Statistics also show that more than forty 
percent of disabled people are digitally inactive.176 While the intergenerational gap might 
reduce over time, as digitally active generations grow older, there will always be a percentage 
of individuals, especially disabled or elderly, who will still be unable to be perform digital 
payments. Studies show that mental health issues make it very difficult for affected 
individuals to use digital technology, thus increasing the risk of payment errors or financial 
exclusion.177    
In interviews, it is often reported that cash makes budgeting easier as users can more readily 
contextualise the financial impact of their purchases on their savings; in other words, it gives 
them a sense of control.178 On the other hand, even for digitally-savvy individuals, it is 
sometimes more challenging to track various expenses and understand how they reflect on 
their account, as most digital payment mechanisms do not show this. Likelihood is that new 
apps might address this problem in the future. Yet, for persons suffering from compulsive 
behaviours, the ready availability of digital money might lead to extra spending, even in the 
presence of apps.179 Indeed, in many of the focus groups organized by the UK Parliament 
and the House of Lords Financial Inclusion Committee, the risk of extra-spending and 
increased debt with digital payments was highlighted as one of the greatest risks.180  Since 
the business model of digital payment services is based on very low consumer fees, most of 
their revenues come from charging fees on overdrafts and selling consumers’ data. The 
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ultimate outcome of this is that those groups that are more prone to overspend, would end 
up subsidizing the cost of the service for everybody else.  
 
C. Network Deficiencies 
As I have argued in the previous section, network efficiencies are fundamental for the 
success of a payment system. However, for technical and regulatory reasons, these are very 
difficult to achieve for digital payments. 
 
1. Interoperability 
Contestability is a key problem in network-based systems such as payments, as they tend to 
lead to monopolies or oligopolies.181 In certain countries this does not constitute a problem. 
For instance, in Sweden the efficiency of the network is due to the well-established history 
of cooperation between banks, which together run the payment system. In other cases, 
however, this is the result of a de-facto monopoly or oligopoly. For instance, in Kenya, the 
success of M-Pesa was due mainly due to the market position of Safaricom, which was the 
leading telecom operator in the country. In China, Alipay’s success is similarly due to 
Alibaba’s commercial power.182 At present, the competition of cash keeps e-payment 
providers’ fees low.183 Yet, experience suggests that in the long term, a monopolistic position 
will inevitably lead to higher costs and fees for consumers.  
In order to guarantee network effects, while maintaining contestability among the various 
e-payment providers, interoperability between providers is key. Yet, at present this is far 
from being guaranteed.184 Interoperability in payments refers to the ability of service 
providers to operate with users outside their network: merchants, end users, governments, 
and firms. Not all retail payment systems require interoperability. Cash and inter-bank 
payments, for instance, bypass this problem by relying on a single infrastructure: the central 
bank. Yet, since the development of electronic payment services in the 1970s with competing 
credit and debit cards issuers, electronic payments have largely developed as separate silos. 
This has led to a number of restraints for users and merchants, who in certain cases could 
only operate within a specific card issuer’s system or else be forced to pay higher fees.185 This 
problem has persisted and, perhaps, increased with the advent of new types of e-payments 
systems such as contactless cards and e-wallets, which rely on competing underlying 
technology.186  
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In a digital ecosystem, only e-payments relying on an underlying bank account will benefit 
from the retail payment infrastructure through the central bank, and thus allow users with 
different payment accounts to perform their transaction. Indeed, their payment, while 
performed online, will simply require a simple clearing and settlement operation through 
the crediting and debiting of payer and payee’s banks’ central bank accounts. However, this 
does not seem to apply to a lot of digital payments offered by e-money issuers. Since e-
money issuers are not banks, and e-money is not a bank deposit, it is impossible for e-money 
issuers to operate on the clearing and settlement infrastructure used by banks.187 This means 
that e-money users will be able to operate payments only among users of the same operator. 
This greatly reduces the network externalities of the entire e-payment system.  
Moreover, the lack of interoperability between different e-money providers greatly increases 
costs as it forces users of different providers to convert their e-money into a different virtual 
currency. In sum, it acts as a tax on e-money usage. We can again find some similarities with 
the history of private banknotes in the 19th Century. Gary Gorton reports that prior to the 
National Bank Act 1863, which established the US Dollar as the national currency, in the US 
alone there were 1500 different bank notes traded in the economy at varying discounts from 
par.188 One of the main reasons why private bank money did not work, was that individuals 
were forced to consider the costs of redeeming the notes when using their banknotes. This 
meant that the $5 note issued by a bank in New Orleans was trading below par in New York. 
Since the holder was forced to spend time and money to travel to New Orleans, the actual 
value of the note, when traded, was much less than its face value. The transfer of the 
monopoly on the issuing of money to central bank fixed this problem by withdrawing money 
issuing rights from the banks.  
 
2. Coverage 
Another key challenge of digital payments is the risk of network disruption.189 One of the 
key ideas in the original notion of legal tender is that money will be accepted as lawful 
discharge of debt anywhere and anytime. Guaranteeing users the ability to pay irrespective 
of their location or the time of day is essential from an economic perspective, especially 
when it comes to small payments. Most of us take this for granted, as banknotes are by nature 
independent from external infrastructure at the point of sale. Once notes are withdrawn 
from the cash machine, they can be used anywhere, even during emergencies.190 Yet, the 
history of money shows very well that even small disruptions in the payment system or the 
circulation of banknotes can create havoc and lead to substantial negative economic 
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effects.191 For instance, the 2016 demonetisation in India led to days of pure mayhem as 
neither banks nor ATMs had enough cash to disburse.192 The ultimate outcome was months 
of financial chaos and a drop in GDP.193 
The problem of e-payment network coverage, alongside that of cyber-security, is a 
fundamental challenge for cashless societies and the technical complexity of cashless 
payment infrastructures might give rise to a number of problems. For instance, the magnetic 
strip might not work, the retailer equipment might be out of service, the account linked to 
the app or card could be blocked because the issuer had detected suspicious transactions, 
or because the card had reached its limit.194 In the UK, where the wireless broadband system 
is very well developed, poor connectivity is still an issue for part of the population.195 In the 
United States, the Federal Communications Commission reported that in rural areas, only 
65% of users have access to high-speed internet, while in Tribal land, the percentage reduces 
to 60%. Overall, around 30 million Americans are left out by the digital economy. Moreover, 
in a cashless system, technological disruption would entail much more disastrous effects.196 
One of the benefits of cash is that it is decentralized. This means that in the case of an attack 
on the central bank, the currency in circulation will not be affected.197 On the contrary, if a 
centralized e-payment system was attacked or hacked, it would automatically affect the entire 
stock of e-money in circulation.  
 
D. Consumer Risks 
In addition, digital payments present unique consumer risks.198 In the event of an e-money 
issuer’s collapse, users would face an immediate liquidity problem. Assuming that those e-
money users would not have access to any other form of money, they would be totally 
excluded from the payment system and unable to purchase their necessities or make any 
other payment. Deposit insurance would cover them, but not immediately. Hence, deposit 
protection in a cashless environment must necessarily be structured differently, as e-money 
users need to be guaranteed an immediate switch from their issuer to the deposit insurance 
fund. One possibility in this regard, is to provide emergency liquidity funding to payment 
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companies as well as banks so that continuity of service will be maintained. Another option, 
which I will discuss in the next section, is for the central bank to offer e-money deposits, as 
a central bank is by definition ‘never illiquid’.199 
Another important aspect of consumer protection – which applies also to bank payments – 
concerns the lack of anonymity of digital payments and the potential abuse of consumers’ 
data.200 Cash is anonymous as it does not require the disclosure of personal information 
between the parties of the transaction. This attribute is both a blessing and a curse as it can 
conceal illegal or fraudulent activities, and thus protect criminals. Indeed, one of the key 
arguments of the proponents of cashless economies is that a world without cash will reduce 
the attractiveness of crime, as criminals will not be able to store the proceeds of their 
crimes.201 At the same time, however, digital payments are able to track users’ financial lives, 
without their full understanding of what digital transparency implies.202 The digital economy 
thrives on the use of big data, which are used to achieve better consumer profiling. Yet, as 
the recent scandals have shown, misuse of personal data is a very high risk. In the app 
economy, data can be used without the individual’s consent and without firms properly 
rewarding consumers for what Shoshana Zuboff defines as their ‘behavioural surplus’.203 It 
is too early to gauge the full implication of this trend, as neither economic thinking nor the 
law have caught up with the complexity of the data economy. Yet, it is clear that at present, 
the implication of the data-for-service bargain that payment firms offer is not well 
understood from the customer’s perspective.  
 
VI. REGULATING MONETARY INCLUSION TODAY 
The previous sections showed that the transition from a banknotes-based economy to a 
cashless economy corresponded to a reduced level of access to the payment system for a 
number of individuals. This is due to the difficulty that some individuals and firms 
experience in accessing bank deposits and, more recently, because of the peculiar structural 
and behavioral challenges of digital payments. The dangers of monetary exclusion are 
becoming even more pressing with the progressive disappearance of cash, which leaves 
unbanked individuals with no real means of monetary inclusion.  Underneath these 
structural changes lies the progressive reduction of the perimeter of state intervention as 
issuer of money, which was replaced by private institutions, chiefly banks. How can we 
guarantee monetary inclusion in a future cashless society? 
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A. Why Combating Cash Discrimination is Not Enough 
As the previous sections show, cash possesses fundamental economic and legal attributes 
that still make it the method of choice for a number of people - and for disadvantaged 
groups, especially.204 In this light, one of the first, and most simple, legal initiatives to combat 
monetary exclusion is to address cash discrimination.205 In various countries, legislation 
preventing discrimination against cash buyers is currently being enforced in various forms. 
Virtually all countries have in place monetary legislation that makes coins and banknotes 
legal tender. However, as explained earlier, the definition of legal tender is very limited. 
Contrary to common belief, legal tender does not impose a requirement upon the parties 
for payments to be carried out with only the designated tender – the national cash and 
banknotes. Instead, legal tender legislation mostly serves to prevent a situation where a 
payer who buys goods with legal tender is then sued for the debt.206 Yet, nothing prevents 
two parties from agreeing that the discharge of the debt can only be done via transfer of 
monetary value through digital payments or through electronic bank transfer. For instance, 
if a restaurant serves food only after the consumer hands over the payment, as most fast 
foods do, a requirement to pay only through digital means would be totally legal.207 
Moreover, legal tender legislation is rarely enforced as courts typically allow businesses to 
decide autonomously how to organize their payments.  
So, despite cash and banknotes being legal tender, opportunities for cash discrimination are 
still present. Certainly, legislation that positively bans discrimination against cash is more 
effective. For instance, in the United States, the Payment Choice Act 2019208 and the Cash 
Always Should Be Honored Act 2019209 which are under discussion at the Congress, would 
make bans on cash outright illegal. Under the Payment Choice Act, individuals would also 
be able to sue a retail establishment for refusing cash payments.210 If these two pieces of 
legislation were passed, coins and banknotes would automatically have a superior legal 
status over other payment methods. The threat of monetary exclusion would surely be 
reduced, albeit in the short term.  
Yet, combating monetary exclusion simply by keeping cash alive is limited and short-sighted 
in many ways. First of all, while keeping cash as a public good does undoubtedly provide 
relief to disadvantaged groups, it does not address the actual lack of access that these group 
experience with regard to digital payments. If the problem of digital and banking exclusion 
is not addressed, we will soon find ourselves living in an economy in which the large majority 
of the society is able to benefit from the externalities of digital payments, while a minority 
will be more and more marginalized. Payments innovations will not stop simply because a 
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minority of users cannot benefit from them. Quite the opposite: there is little doubt that e-
payments’ economic efficiencies are a blessing for consumers and financial institutions and 
will soon reduce the need for cash even further. Not surprisingly, many central banks around 
the world are openly considering reducing reliance on cash and moving progressively 
towards a full electronic payment system.211 Hence, given the constant progress in payments 
technology, over time the gap between cash users and everybody else will only widen. 
As it was succinctly put in the Access to Cash report, the issue is how to achieve a digital 
payment system that works for everyone, and not only for the 80%.212 The next sections will 
argue that the state should regain its centrality in guaranteeing access to the monetary 
system and addressing the inequalities of modern payments. 
 
B. The Rationale for Supply-Side Regulation 
When it comes to the actual market structure and organization of payment and banking 
services, the regulatory model in the western economies such as the UK and the US is based 
on a free market and pro-competition model. In principle, regulators leave banks and 
payment operators to decide autonomously how to offer their services to retail or 
institutional clients. This means that authorized firms are free to decide how to structure 
their offer in terms of services, price, and location. As Baradaran acutely demonstrates in 
her book, How The Other Half Banks, for most US banks, keeping small checking accounts 
is unprofitable. Thus, banks either charge high fees for their services, or simply refuse to 
open accounts to individuals with a bad credit history.213 Credit cards and digital payment 
providers too do not have any obligation to offer universal services. In the UK, the 2017 
Payment Services Regulation requires payment operators to guarantee non-discriminatory and 
fair direct and indirect access to their network to other operators.214 This essentially entails 
a commitment to keep the financial infrastructure of payments systems open to banks, e-
money issuers, smaller banks, and any other payment services firms and thus to create a 
dynamic and competitive payment ecosystem.215 However, the open access requirements do 
not extend to the end-users of payment services – the consumers - who are free to use the 
method of payment that they find most convenient.  
The absence of demand-side constraints means that in a free market model, there is no 
guarantee on the minimum level of access for consumers. Payment operators and banks will 
naturally offer services that make a profit and locate them strategically to achieve economies 
of scope. Not surprisingly, low income communities and rural areas are immediately cut off 
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the bank’s branch network. In the UK, for instance, only the Post Office has a statutory 
obligation to extend its network coverage even in unprofitable locations, which is offset by 
a state subsidy. Banks are instead free to decide where to open a branch. In the transition 
from traditional to digital financial services, the lack of mandatory public service provision 
has already led to a number of problems for consumers, including the steep reduction of 
bank branches across the country, and the progressive disappearance of ATMs.216  The 
problem with free market supply was clearly explained in the recent UK House of Lords 
Financial Inclusion Report.217 In one of the interviews, Responsible Finance, a consumer 
group stated: ‘The costs of entering the financial services markets are significant so it is hard 
to see how, without any incentives, new players would provide services to financially 
excluded groups who are often (although not always) higher risk.”218  
Tackling the problem of monetary inclusion essentially requires the regulation of the supply 
side of finance. It requires the rethinking of the system of incentives driving firms’ decisions 
in order to put the need of end-users at the forefront. In sum, it requires regulation of the 
system as opposed to individual payment operators. The main element of this new 
framework is to guarantee universal access to monetary and payment services.219  
 
C. Access as A Statutory Right in a Cashless World 
In a cashless payment system, the absence of banknotes means that the entirety of the money 
in circulation would be in the form of bank deposits and central bank reserves only.220 In 
such a system, ensuring that all citizens have equal means of payment requires a guarantee 
of access on two levels: the banking system, and the payment system.  
 
1. Access to The Monetary System 
In a digital payment system that works for everyone, equality of payments requires full 
financial inclusion. Without guaranteeing that all citizens have access to the banking system, 
no universal payment system is possible, as there would no longer be the possibility of 
converting cash into the digital money that is tendered for payment. This means that all 
individuals will have to be ‘banked’.  
How to achieve full financial inclusion in a digital ecosystem has been subject to wide debate 
and is still unclear. It is not the scope of this article to discuss the problems of financial 
inclusion and access to credit. However, it is worth discussing a few proposals as relevant to 
the payment system. We can identify two main streams of literature. On the one hand, a few 
commentators suggest franchising the deposit-taking function of banks like a public utility221. 
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Essentially, deposit-taking will be conducted by banks and other deposit-taking institutions 
on behalf of the government and subject to conditions that guarantee the universality of 
access. In order to limit risks, franchised banks will ring-fence deposits and operate as 
narrow banks so that no credit risks will be imposed on depositors. Proponents of this 
option suggest that financial institutions could make their profits by engaging in the lending 
side of the business. A similar proposal envisages the Post Office, which is a public utility 
in most countries already with presence all over the country, to take on basic deposit-taking 
services in competition with banks. Thus, individuals will be able to open state-subsidized 
deposit demand accounts at no cost.222 
A very different option is for central banks to issue deposit accounts to individuals.223 At 
present all central banks are discussing how a fully digital monetary system would look.224 
Given the need to control the money supply, central banks could substitute token-based fiat 
currency with an equivalent amount in digital form. To do so, one of the strategies discussed 
in the literature is for central banks to offer deposit account services to citizens.225 This 
proposal, which builds on much older ideas predating the rise of digital finance, entails the 
central banks taking on the deposit-taking function of banks as monopolists or in 
competition with the financial sector. The benefit of this model is that it will guarantee 
access to bank accounts to otherwise unbanked individuals, while at the same time using 
the central bank settlement infrastructure to mobilize payments in a similar way to what it 
already does with bank’s central bank reserves. Thus, individuals and banks will be issued 
central bank money and will be able to use it to pay with one of the various payment apps 
no differently to how they already do with their bank deposits. At present, the literature is 
still uncertain as to which precise form this model will take and the implications it poses for 
financial stability, monetary policy, and infrastructure management.226 While the proposal 
seems to be efficiently addressing the problem of inclusion on paper, central banks do not 
seem to consider it practical, as it would give rise to problems of competition, credit 
allocation, not to mention the massive increase in the already oversized central banks’ 
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balance sheet.227 Given the abovementioned challenges, a more feasible option would entail 
the central bank issuing Digital Cash Accounts.  
 
2. Access to The Payment System 
Second, individuals will need to have guaranteed access to the actual retail payment services. 
Access to the payment infrastructure poses very different challenges, as it has to do with the 
ability of individuals to intermediate money via digital payment technology. From a practical 
perspective, access requirements operate on two fronts.  
On one level, digital payment instruments need to be universally accessible to users. 
Universality of access can be described as the requirement imposed on payment operators 
to guarantee that all users will be able to use the payment service without undue burden. In 
practical terms, this would require the availability of digital payment platforms that can be 
understood and easily operated by everybody. In this regard, there is a lot of evidence that 
certain groups such as the elderly, visually impaired, or people with cognitive disabilities 
may not be able to operate more complex digital payments applications and might instead 
benefit from having access to basic apps or tokenized forms of payments like cards that give 
a sense of ‘cash’.228  Digital payment operators should not therefore structure their product 
based on the assumption that all consumers are digitally literate. Instead, they should be 
required to provide inclusive services that are demonstrably easy to use.  
The UK and the US are in the best position to lead on this issue, as both countries are at 
the forefront of digital innovation in financial services. From a regulatory viewpoint, the UK 
Financial Conduct Authority has paved the way in the supervision of FinTech firms, and it 
is one of the world leaders in the regulation of digital financial services. Various FCA 
projects such as ‘Innovate’ or the ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ have enabled start-ups and 
established firms to test new products in a regulated and safe environment before launching 
them to the mass market.229 In the US, the Financial Consumer Protection Bureau has 
followed on the UK lead and opened the first US regulatory sandbox in 2018.230 In this light, 
it is not difficult to envisage a more structured role for both the FCA and the FCPB as the 
controller of the quality of the digital products offered in terms of the consumer perspective.  
On a different level, universal access to payments technology requires the presence of a 
payment infrastructure that guarantees the acceptance of digital payment by retailers and 
individuals. Indeed, a digital payment system would be inoperable without the assurance 
that the digital payment tendered in discharge of debt will be accepted as valid and final by 
the payee. Achieving universality of access requires both legal innovations, and an upgrade 
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of the payment system. One option to guarantee access to digital payments is to declare e-
money as legal tender.231 At present, the lack of interoperability between rival digital payment 
systems, and the likelihood of different incentive structures among rival digital payment 
methods, could lead to fragmentation of the market, with some retailers accepting one 
method and not others.232 Adopting a rule whereby all digital payments must be accepted as 
valid tender would solve the network problems of cashless economies, and at the same time 
give a boost to the use of digital cash in the transition to a full cashless society. It is indeed 
customary that when a new currency is created, more recently the Euro, the issuing 
government declares it legal tender and obliges everyone to accept it as valid payment. Not 
surprisingly, most working papers on central bank digital currencies suggest the future 
sovereign digital currencies as having full legal tender status.233  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Because of their key economic function, payments are usually considered the most essential 
financial service. Indeed, they are used by the quasi-totality of the population to transfer 
value, from the simple act of buying milk to the purchase of a house. The availability of 
payment instruments to discharge debt obligations is therefore indispensable for individuals 
and firms, as it enables them to participate actively in the economy as both consumers and 
traders. Thus, ensuring a level playing field among individuals in the access of payment 
system is fundamental for a society that wants to guarantee individuals’ socio-economic 
equality. This essay argues that the state should regain its central role in the payment 
infrastructure and put financial inclusion at the core of the regulatory agenda. 
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